

## **Integral Theory, Pragmatism, and the Future of Philosophy**

Zachary Stein

Lectica, Inc.

Harvard University

[I intend] to outline a philosophy so comprehensive that...the entire work of human reason... shall appear as the filling up of its details.

-C.S. Peirce (letter to William James, 1888)

Considerations about the future of Integral approaches to philosophy should be informed by an understanding of the various lineages contributing to its emergence. I have noted in several publications that many aspects of Ken Wilber's work land him squarely in the tradition of American Pragmatism (Stein, 2007; 2010a; in press). In this paper I elaborate on this claim, demonstrating the interpretive benefits and accuracy of characterizing Wilber as a pragmatist as well as the continued relevance of this approach to philosophy. I first clarify some confusion around what it means to be a pragmatist, suggesting that it is a non-exclusive identity built around a complex set of overlapping commitments. That is, there are many ways to be a pragmatist, and being one does not rule out being other things as well. I then discuss some of the similarities between Wilber's work and the work of key pragmatists, specifically Peirce, James, and Dewey. I explore a constellation of 6 philosophical themes that both link Wilber to this lineage and display its continued relevance, namely: philosophical psychology, epistemic comprehensiveness, action-oriented theorizing, the integration of science and religion, evolutionary metaphysics, and social emancipation.

*Introduction: solutions to 21<sup>st</sup> century problems in 19<sup>th</sup> century texts*

The distinctive office, problems, and subject matter of philosophy grow out of the stresses and strains of the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises. It's specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human history.... The problems with which a philosophy relevant to the present must deal are those growing out of changes going on with ever increasing rapidity, over ever-increasing human-geographical range, and with ever-deepening intensity of penetration.

-John Dewey (1920)

Philosophers work in socio-cultural contexts, under historically specific conditions, with access to certain communication technologies, libraries, and media. Wilber has been publishing books since 1971, producing a corpus that spans some 10,000-thousand pages. He has worked with the changing times, from pen and paper to word processor, to the personal computer, and eventually to Internet facilitated multi-media educational initiatives. Moreover, like the other Pragmatists discussed below, Wilber worked in response to a dynamically transforming American culture during a period of tremendous global change. At the risk of oversimplifying things, it could be said that the Classical American Pragmatists worked at the beginning of an epoch during which global techno-economic infrastructures were beginning a rapid transformation, while Wilber worked during the end of this epoch—in the twilight of America's global dominance, in a world newly integrated via networks of industrial, transportation, communications, and computer technologies. Thus, reflective critics have rightly suggested that it is as if the Pragmatists began a sentence about the human condition, and Wilber completed it (Carreira, 2007).

The subject of that sentence would be the new self-understanding of our species that is being created as the result of profound evolutionary transformations in our societies, cultures and scientific technologies. When James and Peirce first convened the Metaphysical Club at Harvard 1871 they were aware that certain new ideas were ascending to prominence in the broader *Zeitgeist*, ideas big enough to signal a coming reorientation or repositioning of humanity's understanding of itself in the universe (Menand, 2001). Today we reap the fruits of seeds sown in the Century that followed those first meeting of the Pragmatists in Cambridge. These years saw psychology replace theology as the preferred language of self-understanding and interiority. The academy transformed with the birth of the modern research university as the increasing bureaucratization, and fragmentation of knowledge led to reflective appeals for more comprehensive epistemological approaches. Action oriented theorizing supplanted pure research across many fields, as science became wedded to technology, from physics to medicine. There were increasing conflicts between science and religion and calls for their integration, just as evolutionary theory replaced creationist myths for large segments of the population. Institutional innovation in the name of social emancipation proliferated as traditional forms of life disintegrated in the flux of cultural and economic modernization.

These 6 themes — philosophical psychology, epistemic comprehensiveness, action-oriented theorizing, the integration of science and religion, evolutionary metaphysics, and social emancipation—form the core of the discussion below. They link Wilber to the Pragmatist tradition and in turn link the Pragmatist tradition to certain fundamental geo-historical

transformations that continue to shape the contemporary scene. These transformations are best grouped under the term: *planetization*. This is process I have discussed before (Stein, in review), with reference to variety of theorists who contrast economic processes of *globalization* (the homogenized, single-capitalist-path-to-flourishing approach), with the evolutionarily inevitable and predominantly cultural processes of *planetization*. This is the dialectic of global transformation, as economic structures expand to a vast planetary scale, bringing in their wake communication and information infrastructures, as well as large-scale migration and urbanization (Held, 2007). These trends have brought the birth of a truly global culture and consciousness as well as the possibility of the self-inflicted extinction of humanity. The poly-centric global civilization that is emerging in the early decades of the 21st century is unprecedented in its complexity and scope.

Pragmatism is as much a reaction to this state of affairs as it is to any trends in academic philosophy or psychology. While Pragmatists tend to share a set of overlapping philosophical commitments—beyond those listed above they also tend to posit the primacy of practice over theory, the radically social and processual nature of knowledge production processes, the centrality of language, and the epistemic value of 1<sup>st</sup> person experiences (to name a few)—they also share a commitment to a unique and powerful form of *cosmopolitanism*. Peirce (Brent, 1998), James (Richardson, 2010), and Dewey (Westbrook, 1999) were self-consciously creating a worldview that could accommodate a variety of pressing global trends, including the ascension of science as an aspect of cultural meaning-making, the rapid transformation of socio-economic

life due to technology, and the emerging prospects of a perpetually mobilized military industrial complex (Hook, 1939).

The typical characterization of Pragmatism as a distinctly American orientation is also misleading in so far as it overlooks the fact that key themes raised by Pragmatists were also raised during the same period by philosophers who are archetypally European, such as Marx, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. This connection between Pragmatism and continental philosophy has not gone unnoticed (Aboulaflia, Bookman & Kemp, 2001). Habermas (1992), himself a declared pragmatist, fondly considers the Classical Pragmatists as the American Young Hegelians. Standard treatments of the tradition overlook these confluences that lift Pragmatism from its parochial enclave of cowboys and behaviorism. More sophisticated recent treatments have drawn attention to the untold story of Pragmatism, which casts it as a preemptive solution to the problem of post-modernity (Brandom, 2011; Habermas, 1992). I endorse this view of Pragmatism, which positions contemporaries like Rorty on the fringes, takes Peirce and James' metaphysics seriously, and seeks solutions to 21<sup>st</sup> Century problems prefigured in 19<sup>th</sup> Century texts.

These observations are the first word on the topic addressed here. Given limitations of space, I can offer only a suggestive discussion of the ways in which Wilber shares certain common orientations to the 6 themes listed above, and thus ultimately echoes and amplifies the Pragmatists. Using a method I have used elsewhere (Stein, 2010a), I am undertaking a partial and provisional *reconstruction* of a tradition and not attempting to detail the full complexity of the

theorists and theories. I offer a story wherein the Pragmatists speak in unison, and along with Wilber, articulate a broad set of shared philosophical commitments that ultimately constitute an emergent worldview and a coherent response to the radical global transformations of our time. There are other stories, however, wherein the Pragmatists do not see eye to eye, nor share such a common voice. Likewise, given Wilber's scant use of texts by the Pragmatists, there are stories where they never really meet, let alone speak the same language. I do not pursue an account of the enlightening *discontinuities* that could be examined. My goal here is to focus on the continuities, unities, and harmonies that emerge if we try to cast Wilber as an heir to the great American philosophers who preceded him. The continued relevance of Pragmatism and the self-understanding of future Integral approaches to philosophy are the overarching topic of my discussion. Below I take up each theme and explore how Wilber's approach reflects the approaches pioneered by the Pragmatists.

*Wilber the Pragmatist; Pragmatism as an Integral Philosophy*

The meaning of a statement is the mode of its enactment.

-Ken Wilber (2010)

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.

-C.S. Peirce (1887)

In a series of prior papers I placed Wilber's writings in historical context by rationally reconstructing some of the thought-traditions that converge in his work. I've traced back a unique form of meta-theorizing, from Wilber to Peirce and Baldwin (Stein, 2010a). This is a tradition of normatively oriented meta-theorizing where the theorist organizes knowledge across many domains according to a set of principled distinctions as a means for directing future knowledge building toward certain aims. Meta-theory in this tradition plays a discourse-regulative role, coordinating, integrating, and reflecting upon knowledge produced by the special disciplines with an eye toward shaping future knowledge production processes in specific directions, e.g., toward more integral, comprehensive forms of knowledge. I have also explored Wilber's ties to traditions in developmental psychology, third wave or humanistic psychology, and the human potential movement (Stein & Hikkenin, 2008; Stein, in review). I've noted that Wilber's role of theoretical psychologist and East-West synthesizer has some precedence, beginning all the way back with Williams James. And more recently (Stein, in press), I've characterized Wilber as a philosopher with certain proclivities for popularity, cosmopolitanism, and soteriological (salvific/emancipatory) forms of knowledge production, which again align him with the Pragmatists. Here I only explore 6 themes: philosophical psychology, epistemic comprehensiveness, action-oriented theorizing, the integration of science and religion, evolutionary metaphysics, and social emancipation.

***Philosophical psychology.*** William James (1890) is well known as the father of American psychology. His synthetic and speculative appropriation of the “new psychology” from Europe made the young science palatable to Americans still wedded to theology and “mental philosophy” (Richardson, 2007). Dewey (1887) is also known as a psychologist, especially his work counteracting the reductionism of early experimentalists through his rigorous theoretical treatment of the reflex-arc concept. Less well known are Peirce’s contributions to psychology, yet he was, in fact, the first person to conduct psychological experiments on American soil and continued to make substantial contributions to theoretical psychology throughout his life (Cadwallader, 1975). Interestingly, aside from the sub-themes to be considered below, these philosopher-psychologists also share with Wilber the distinction of *beginning* their careers as psychologists, while ending them as philosophers. And while Wilber did his experiments on the meditation cushion as a leading figure in trans-personal psychology, Peirce, James, and Dewey cut their teeth in the psychological laboratories of their day before branching out toward broader horizons. Like Wilber, their early concerns with psychology shaped their dealings with philosophy later in life. As I discuss in this section, all four—Peirce, James, Dewey, and Wilber—maintain at least three commitments with regards to psychology as a field. They all maintain that findings from psychology are relevant when considering philosophical questions. They all look beyond the bounds of given empirical findings in attempts to clarify the workings of the higher psychological functions. And they are all preoccupied with the psychology of religious experience in particular.



The Classical Pragmatists and Wilber share a meta-philosophical position that the findings of empirical psychology have relevance for traditional philosophical problems and inquiries. This is an important theme in the works of other 20<sup>th</sup> Century psychologists, such as Jean Piaget (1970) and George Hebert Mead (1981), who likewise understood that the science of psychology had forever changed the nature of many philosophical problems, such as those about the nature of human knowledge and moral agency. Wilber, for example, has used findings from developmental psychology to structure his epistemological (e.g., appendix II in Wilber, 2010) and ethical principles (e.g., the Basic Moral Imperative, per Wilber, 1995). James and Peirce adopted similar approaches in their treatments of many foundational philosophical issues. The principle of pragmatism itself, as first articulated by Peirce, was heavily influenced by the psychological findings and theories of Alexander Bain (Brent, 1997).

But the idea that philosophy should be informed by psychology runs counter to many schools of philosophical thought that maintain the irrelevance of psychological data for philosophy (e.g., Frege, Russell, and most of the analytical movement). Moreover, the kind of appropriation of psychology undertaken by philosophers like James and Wilber also runs counter to the kinds of appropriations made by contemporary reductionists (e.g., Churchland and Dennet), who use psychology and neuroscience to *explain away* philosophical problems instead of creating novel action-orienting solutions. In the context of a global culture increasingly taken with scientific explanations the Pragmatist were the first to model a strategy later adopted by Wilber, that of using the human sciences to inform philosophical inquiries, while not limiting the

conclusions of those inquires to the conclusions of any one discipline or experimental paradigm. They were all seeking a psychology capable of handling the whole person through a kind of methodological pluralism.

Relatedly, the Pragmatists and Wilber also share an interest in psychological theorizing about the so-called “higher psychological functions.” This has always involved extrapolating beyond the data to characterize the upper reaches and outer limits of human experience and capability. Wilber’s (1995; 1999; 2010) explorations of the limits of human consciousness, transformation, and development have yielded a broad framework for understanding the farther-reaches of human nature. This quest for a map of the frontiers and boundaries of human thought and action was prefigured by Peirce, who was interested in the nature of the logical and mathematical norms that govern thought, including the human capability to build and test explicit theories and to reason about infinity and the trans-infinite. He hypothesized that there are natural structures and laws that channel the evolution of higher-order thought and constrain the architecture of reasonable theories. He did his best to relate these ideas to the crude neuroscience and psychology of his day and ended up positing processes that resemble very closely those posited by contemporary theories in neural network modeling and cognitive developmental psychology. Dewey was likewise after a psychology of the “higher-mental functions” that could characterize the difference between *sentience* and *sapience* and reveal the deeper structured order allowing for human reason, scientific inquiry, and social and aesthetic imagination (Sellars, 1950; Dewey, 1938). And of course, James is most famous for *Varieties of Religious Experience*

(1902), which considers numerous cases of extraordinary sensory and physical abilities associated with mystical and religious experiences.

*Varieties* brings us to a yet another point of connection between Wilber and the Pragmatists, their preoccupation with the psychology of religious experience. James is one of the most important figures in the psychology of religion and religious experience. Less well known are the concerns with the psychology of religiosity that run through the works of Dewey (1934) and Peirce (Brent, 1997). The Pragmatists, like Wilber, view religious experiences as both *explicable* in scientific terms, and as *inhabitable* as a practice or experience. The interanimation of 3<sup>rd</sup>-person and 1<sup>st</sup>-person approaches to religion and religious experience again sets Wilber in camp with James and Peirce as a phenomenologist exploring the realities of mystical states, while also arguing for them with the psychology of the day. Importantly, these open-minded and exploratory stances reflect articulate commitments to forms of epistemic inclusiveness and comprehensiveness.

***Epistemic comprehensiveness.*** Along with the emergence of science as a dominant force in culture and industry came questions about the value of non-scientific forms of knowledge. Modernization involved the devaluation of a range of ways that humans had traditionally understood the world and themselves. Peirce, James, and Dewey worked in the wake of the first great scientific contributions to public welfare and knowledge and during the height of rhetoric for the “scientization” of everything. The Pragmatists accepted the importance and effectiveness of scientific knowledge, but worked to limit the epistemic exclusivity of the reductionist and

empiricist ideologies that accompanied the ascendancy of the sciences. Like Wilber their criticisms are not anti-science, but rather, as Peirce (1898) so clearly explicated, they understand that the principles of science itself compel us beyond any given or current sense of what is or is not real, explainable, or inexplicable.

Peirce began his career arguing in favor of a kind of radical empiricism and materialism, but would later transcend and include his earlier views in the process of building a philosophical system capable of accounting for and “housing” a wide variety of validity claims and methodological approaches (Apel, 1995). James and Dewey were likewise both avidly scientific and yet epistemologically permissive, in that they admitted a wide variety of phenomena and data into the purview of scientific methods. A similar approach has been adopted by Habermas (1992) who explicitly links his theory of communicative rationality to the insights of Peirce and Dewey. And Wilber took from Habermas what Habermas had taken from Peirce: the idea of a comprehensive system for classifying forms of human knowledge that is built around the system of basic pronouns at the heart of every language: I, We, and It. Peirce had, of course, followed Kant in seeking the foundations for a philosophy that could extend epistemic legitimacy to the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. As I have argued elsewhere (Stein, 2010), a justified commitment to epistemic comprehensiveness is one of the principle virtues of Integral Theory and one of its greatest ties to the Pragmatist tradition.

***Action-oriented theorizing.*** Importantly, analyzing the dynamics of interactions between the three primordial forms of reason lead Kant (2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> *Critiques*) to privilege the practical or

actionable over the theoretical or speculative; that is, giving priority to questions about *what is good to do* over questions about *what is the case with the world*. This Kantian proclivity for action over theory was diverted through Hegel to Marx in Europe and through Hegel to Peirce and Dewey in America (Habermas, 1992). The central innovation in both Marxism and Pragmatism is an explicit reversal of the traditional theory-practice relation, a switching of the value and authority given to these respective orientations.

For the Pragmatists, although they express it differently, and unpack different implication—*ideas and actions are symbiotically related*. Theory and practice are inseparable, and co-constitutive, with practice engendering new theory, which in turn engenders new practice. This dialectic plays out at multiple levels (from individuals to communities of inquiry) enabling both virtuous cycles of learning, and viscous cycles of ideological self-replication (Bhaskar, 1993). The inter-animation of thought and action can be found in the specific and precise theory/practice constellation of an ongoing research program—where hypotheses are born from reflection on the results of prior experimental actions, only to be put to the test by future experimental actions that will, in turn, generate new hypotheses. The same broad notion also applies to the more vague and compelling ideas that populate our worldviews and identities, illuminating their genesis in our active social lives, and their inevitable result in actions and practices carried out by individuals and institutions.

According to this view, because ideas emerge from actions and actions emerge from ideas, *ideas cannot be evaluated apart from the forms of life they help to create*. This is not a

commitment to a crude form of instrumentalism—where an idea is true because it has made something work—let alone a kind of placebo-ism—where it doesn't matter if it is true as long as it works. It is rather a commitment to bring about *the unity of theory and practice in practice*, if I can read a Marxist phrase as applicable to Peirce and Dewey (America's Young Hegelians). This means that ideas are more than the sum of what can be said, written, or thought and their validity must be determined according to their *careers* in the world of action, both social and technical.

As Peirce (1884) used to say, *ideas are alive*, and they are progressively strengthened and weakened, growing or diminishing, according to the ways they sustain, and are sustained by, the complex ecologies of our practices and actions. That means if we want to test ideas, or determine their validity, we must think in terms of wider criterion than are typically considered in epistemologies that divide theory from practice and thus limit the number and type of validity claims that are relevant. This brings us back our earlier considerations about epistemic comprehensiveness. Wilber is aligned along multiple epistemic fronts with the Pragmatists, both in giving primacy to action and lived experience as an aspect of theory and abstract knowledge, and in crafting a system that inter-animates the epistemological and practical/moral domains.

***Integration of science and religion.*** Perhaps one of the most important places where Wilber puts his action-oriented and epistemologically permissive theory of knowledge to work is in his arguments concerning the relationships between science and religion (Wilber, 1995; Esbjörn-Hargens & Wilber, 2006). Broadly speaking, this combination of a comprehensive epistemological framework with an overarching concern about the consequences and

demonstrable results of practices, both scientific and religious, allows Wilber to place these reputedly “non-overlapping magisteria” into a common framework of shared meaning.

Commonalities can be found between this approach and the approach of Peirce, who was likewise motivated to apply the tools from his philosophical system to the problem of integrating science and religion (Peirce, 1958). James, though less systematic, applied his talents to no less a degree in addressing the question, and like Peirce and Wilber, endorsed an epistemologically sophisticated and ultimately conciliatory view. The common thread between their positions is that religion and science are not opposites or antagonistic polarities, but rather complimentary and continuous ways of understanding and dealing with the human condition.

***Evolutionary metaphysics.*** Importantly, all these views integrating science and religion involve to a large degree supplementary arguments concerning the evolution of humanity and the cosmos. It is no coincidence that since Darwin discussions about the relations between religion and science have led to discussions about evolution and the position of humanity in the universe. The Pragmatists were all thoroughgoing evolutionary thinkers and all embraced some form of evolutionary cosmology or metaphysics (Wiener, 1949). Peirce articulated the most complex by far, even more so than Wilber, as toward the end of his life (starving to death in rural Pennsylvania) he offered one of the most complex evolutionary panpsychist-pansemiotic metaphysical systems ever created. Interestingly, one of the few places Wilber mentions Peirce is during a discussion of his own evolutionary metaphysics, specifically with reference to the idea of Kosmic Habits (Wilber, 2005). The idea that the universe evolves from flux to order through

the establishment of habits, fields, or patterns of emergent and then continually re-generated structures is found in contemporary chaos and complexity theory; but it was first articulated by Peirce in the 1880s (Peirce, 1884; 1888; Popper, 1972). Importantly, both Wilber and Peirce go where the majority of chaos theorists will not and suggest that the norms humans create and the ways we organize our social lives create patterns that literally structure the future of evolution on the planet.

***Social emancipation.*** Both Peirce and Wilber evoke Kant when they discuss the implications of the Kosmic Habit theory for humanity. One articulation of the categorical imperative, the ethical principle at the heart of Kant's entire philosophical system, states that we should act only according to norms that we could endorse as future laws of nature. This means, in essence, that we should consider ourselves as co-creators of the future of nature, both organic and human, and act as if we were laying down groves for the future to follow. This unpacks as an obligation to act in coherent and reasonable ways and to consider the implications of our action and their ramifications for the future of human nature and social relations. It also compels one to honor humanity and the fullness of human potential. Wilber is, among other things, a theorist of human potential. He has consistently used psychological research as a framework for considering how to improve and liberate human capability.

Similarly, Peirce, James, and Dewey were vocal in their dissatisfaction with the psychology of their day because it failed to address the developmental and normative aspects of human thought. Dewey (1929), the educationist, was asking for a psychological science that



could inform a broader science of human transformation and learning, a science of education capable of liberating the entirety of society's human potential. Peirce (1868) was asking for a psychology capable of explaining and prescribing logical and mathematical norms in order to build an applied science dedicated to the improvement human thought and inquiry. Peirce was looking to position this ameliorative psychology as a means for catalyzing social transformation toward his envisioned ideal of *a communication community coterminous with the cosmos*—an ideal that is the condition for the possibility of scientific truth and inquiry, according to Peirce's philosophy (Apel, 1995). We are thus brought back to where we began, with considerations of the geo-historical social transformation that informed the action-orienting self-understanding of the pragmatists, and that has also shaped the contours of Integral Theory.

*Conclusion: planetization and the future of philosophy*

Since the end of WWII there has been an acceleration of technological innovation and a related expansion of international economic and legal structures, all of unprecedented size and scope. This has created trends that have touched the lives of every person on the planet, weaving all of humanity into the fabric of a common history for the first time (McCarthy, 1978). The beginning of this remarkable era involved the liberation of science and industry from the normative texture of the lifeworld, as war mobilization efforts placed them on independent developmental trajectories (Nobel, 1979). The unchecked proliferation of industrial and communications technologies that resulted would transform the planet, radically increasing the

complexity and intensity of human life and ultimately endangering the continued existence of the species. Simultaneously, there has been a deepening of human knowledge and experience, as wide swaths of humanity are being drawn into a fragile new global culture of remarkable diversity and scope. The specter of a homogenizing and oppressive *globalization* haunts the actual and necessary processes of *planetization* that are currently being played out. Those inhabiting the planetary civilization of the future will live in structures built in the half-light of our immature world-centric philosophies. As crises of global scope continue to occur more frequently we will grope for global frameworks to organize the increasing complexity and fragmentation of our experience. The 6 themes discussed above represent a constellation of issues near the heart of our emerging global crisis and indicate the kind of philosophical response that is needed.

Technology enabled advances in the human sciences are already continually transforming the languages we use to understand ourselves. Brain science and psychology are adapted to explain a wide variety of controversial social norms, such as greed, infidelity, and narcissism. The cognitive and brain sciences are also being used to *explain away* a variety of more “spooky” human abilities, like empathy, mystical union, and morality. These passing pop-sci headlines betray a deeper uncertainty about who and what we are. What will be the accumulated impacts of this culture based on a transient and continually re-explained sense of human nature? We face the possibility of a species-wide identity crisis resulting from the fracturing and “disenchantment” of our action-orienting self-understandings (Habermas, 2003; Stein, in press;

2010). A philosophy is needed that can translate the results of the psychological sciences into languages that addresses our self-understandings and the social and cultural realities of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1990; Wilber, 1999). Pragmatism represents a tradition that has positioned psychology in terms of a broader set of philosophical commitments and is thus capable of appropriately negotiating between the claims of the lifeworld and those special sciences for the self-understanding of the species. Integral approaches to philosophy must likewise take up the challenge of, as Habermas (1990) has put it, serving as a stand-in-interpreter, or integrative translator, between the ever advancing human-sciences and the self-understanding of a species that is, for the first time, self-consciously united in a single planetary narrative.

Our understanding of this emerging geo-historical meta-narrative is also obscured by the fragmentation and irrelevance of knowledge production in the contemporary academy (Menand, 2010; Stein, 2010a). As noted above, the Pragmatists worked at the beginning of an era that was to be dominated by the ascendancy of science as a form of inquiry and the related depreciation of traditional, non-or-extra-scientific, and value landed knowledge claims. The Pragmatists' commitments to epistemological comprehensiveness and their arguments for action-oriented approaches to theory and research were attempts to counter-act a newly formed techno-science-industry complex that was beginning to enshrine reductionist and ontologically-monovalent meta-theories of knowledge in the large-scale research universities being built at the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century. This has led us to today, a time when universities are privatizing, profiting, and proliferating under the banner of tech-enabled educational equity and student loan speculations.

Contemporary Integrally oriented philosophers must now carry out a problem-focused transdisciplinary integration of diverse and fragmented academic knowledge production processes. Peirce came to believe that in order to do truly integrative interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary work it is often necessary to build a new layer on top of the existing educational system. The graduate school and medieval doctoral certification system were imported to America from Germany during Peirce's time at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, and he was a vocal supporter of the *ideal* of the University they implied—cosmopolitan, trans-political, humanistic, philanthropic, and scientific. He never landed in the universities of his time, in part because of his allegiance to this *ideal* of the University. This same ideal compels Integral philosophers to undertake projects in epistemic comprehensiveness—integral knowledge production and application—beyond the university system as it currently exists. This involves transcending but including the 20<sup>th</sup> Century's disciplinary fragmentation in the structure of a 21<sup>st</sup> Century problem-focused research and development complex.

Moreover, the institutionalization of epistemologically comprehensive forms of action-oriented research ought to be guided by the pursuit of innovations that will liberate human potential and result in the emancipation of humanity on a planetary scale. Beyond the aforementioned species wide identity crises, there are also the impending crises accompanying the exhaustion of biological tolerance for the global industrial infrastructure. Efforts made by the midwives of the coming post-industrial global eco-commons must be guided by profound sensitivities to the forms of social life engendered by future 'world saving' technologies, be they

biological, computational, or geo-architectonic. Social emancipation is different from mere survival. Survival is a physical precondition for emancipation, which amounts to much more than physical *sustainability*. Emancipation occurs in social structures that allow individuals the freedom to take up reflectively chosen life-projects and conceptions of the good. Some life-projects and goods are to be preferred over others, and although they can't be mandated, they can be encouraged through skillful design. Integral philosophers will be quick to point out that there are some conceptions of the good life that include forms of emancipation typically described as religious or spiritual. Of course, these kinds of religious social structures and personality systems are at the center of the current global problematic.

Contemporary global philosophies are turning to address the dynamic, powerful, and indelible religiosity of humanity. The Pragmatists, like Wilber, are looking to articulate a coherent cosmopolitan identity, consistent with science, and yet inclusive of religion and religious experience. Their broader reflections about the possibility for integrating science and religion, and for reconciling religious intolerance in the global public sphere, are the result of experiences with lived traditions (Perice, Wilber) and with non-institutionalized, spontaneous religious experience (Dewey; James). The Pragmatists' vocal shared embrace of an evolutionary worldview eased the tensions between religious traditions and scientific innovations and opened the public's social imagination concerning religious forms. With Vivekananda's appearance at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893, and James's subsequent, Transcendentalist echoing, introduction of Eastern philosophy to Harvard, there emerged in America a fascinating

proliferation of religious organizations and forms of teacherly and doctrinal authority (Stein, 2011).

Today, trans-lineage, post-conventional religious formations are emerging to foster global peace coalitions, many claiming James in their East-West lineage. However, their ‘world saving’ dharma is not immune from the risk of creating unacceptably distorted social forms and identity structures. Integral philosophy must not shy away from considerations about the future of global religious configurations, nor from articulating preferable possibilities for the future of religion. James’s ([1910] 1982) dictums about our needing to find a moral/religious equivalent to war ring more true now than ever, especially in our age of perpetual wars involving military operations of enormous scope and cost. Tremendous energy would be rechanneled in the event of a global religious revival-through-unity, as for millennia economies have been restructured around intentional communities of religious or spiritual vocation. Trans-governmental religious organizations will have the opportunity to spawn vast educational configurations in the coming decades, as lifeworlds will continue being decentered via the relentless push of *planetization*, creating fervent and widespread searching for certainty, liberation, and hope.

I have discussed 6 themes — philosophical psychology, epistemic comprehensiveness, action-oriented theorizing, the integration of science and religion, evolutionary metaphysics, and social emancipation. These themes link Wilber to the Pragmatist tradition and in turn link the Pragmatist tradition to certain fundamental geo-historical transformations that continue to shape the contemporary scene. These transformations are best grouped under the term: *planetization*.

This is the dialectic of global transformation, as economic structures expand to a vast planetary scale, bringing in their wake communication and information infrastructures, as well as large-scale migration and urbanization. These trends have brought the birth of a truly global culture and consciousness as well as the possibility of the self-inflicted extinction of humanity. The poly-centric global civilization that is emerging in the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is unprecedented in its complexity and scope. I have argued that Pragmatism is as much a reaction to this state of affairs as it is to any trends in academic philosophy or psychology. The Pragmatists were self-consciously creating a worldview that could accommodate a variety of pressing global trends, including the ascension of science as an aspect of cultural meaning-making, the rapid transformation of socio-economic life due to technology, and the emerging prospects of a perpetually mobilized military industrial complex. The overarching point here has been that Integral Philosophy should understand itself as continuous with this tradition. We therefore ought to continue work toward the accomplishment of the goals set out by the Pragmatists, who would have us reconstruct society in light of a reconstructed philosophy, an Integral Philosophy—comprehensive, action-oriented, evolutionary, and hopeful.

## Sources:

- Aboulafia, M. Bookman, M. & Kemp C. (2002). *Habermas and Pragmatism*. Routledge. New York.
- Apel, K.O. (1995). *Charles Sanders Peirce: from pragmatism to pragmaticism*. Humanities Press. London.
- Bhaskar, R. (1993). *Dialectic: the pulse of freedom*. New York: Verso.
- Brandt, Robert. (2011). *Perspectives on Pragmatism: classical, recent, contemporary*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.
- Brent, Joseph. (1997). *Charles Sanders Peirce: a life*. Indiana University Press. Bloomington.
- Cadwallader, T.C. (1975). Peirce as an experimental psychologist. *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 11.
- Carreira, Jeff. (2006). *Personal correspondence*. August. Cambridge MA.
- Dewey, John. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Dewey, John. (1920) *Reconstructions in philosophy*. Beacon Press. Boston.
- Dewey, John. (1938). *Logic: the theory of inquiry*. Carbondale, IL: SIU Press.
- Dewey, John. ([1887] 1975). *Psychology*. Edwardsville, IL: SIU Press.
- Esbjörn-Hargens, S., & Wilber, K. (2006). Towards a comprehensive integration of science and religion: A post-metaphysical approach, in *The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp 523 – 546.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (1990a). *Philosophy as stand-in interpreter* (C. L. a. S. Nichol森, Trans.) *Moral consciousness and communicative action* (pp. 1-21). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (1992). *Themes in post-metaphysical thinking* (W. Hohengarten, Trans.) *Post-metaphysical thinking: philosophical essays* (pp. 28-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (2003). *The future of human nature*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.



- Hook, S. (1939). *John Dewey: an intellectual portrait*. Prometheus Books. New York.
- McGrew, A. & Held, David (2007) *Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies*. Wiley. New York.
- James, William. (1909). *The varieties if religious experience*. New York: Viking Press.
- James, William, ([1910] 1982). *Essays in religion and morality*. Harvard Univerity Press. Cambridge.
- James, William. ([1890] 1950). *The principles of psychology (Vol. 1-2)*: Dover Publications, Inc.
- McCarthy, Thomas. (1978). *The critical theory of Jurgen Habermas*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mead, George Herbert. (1981). *Selected writings*. Chicago University of Chicago press.
- Menand, L. (2001) *The metaphysical club: a story of American Ideas*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York.
- Menand, L. (2010). *The market place of ideas: reform and resistance in the American academy*. Norton. New York.
- Nobel, David. (1979). *America by design: science, technology, and the rise of corporate capitalism*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
- Peirce, C.S. (1868a). Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man. In P. e. project (Ed.), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition (Vol. 2, pp. 193-211)*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Peirce, C.S. (1878c). How to make our ideas clear. In P. e. project (Ed.), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition (Vol. 3, pp. 257-276)*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Peirce, C.S. (1884). Design and chance. In P. e. project (Ed.), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition (Vol. 4, pp. 544-554)*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Peirce, C.S. (1888). A guess at the riddle. In P. e. project (Ed.), *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: a chronological edition (Vol. 6, pp. 166-203)*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

- Peirce, C.S. (1898 ). Reasoning and the logical of things: the Cambridge conference lectures of 1898. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
- Peirce, C.S. (1958). Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Vol. II. (Ed.) Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Piaget, J. (1970). The place of the sciences of man in the system of sciences. New York: Harper & Row.
- Popper, K. (1972). Objective Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, Robert, D. (2007) William James: in the maelstrom of modernity. Houghton Mifflin. New York
- Sellars, W. (1950). Language, Rules, and Behavior. In Hook (Ed.), John Dewey: philosopher of science and freedom. New York: Dial Press.
- Stein, Z. (2007). Modeling the demands of interdisciplinarity. *Integral Review*. 4.
- Stein, Z & Hiekkinen, K. (2008). On operationalizing aspects of altitude: an introduction to the Lectical Assessment System for Integral researchers. *Journal of Integral Theory and Practice*. Spring. Vol 3. No 1.
- Stein, Z. (2010) On the difference between designing children and raising them: ethics and the use of educationally oriented biotechnologies. *Mind, Brain, and Education*. Vol. 4. No. 2. 53-67.
- Stein, Z. (2010a) On the normative function of meta-theoretical endeavors. *Integral Review*. Vol. 6, No. 3.
- Stein, Z. (2012) On spiritual teachers and teachings. *Journal of Integral Theory and Practice*. Vol 6. No 1.
- Stein, Z. (in review) Between philosophy and prophecy. To appear in *True but partial: Essential criticisms of Integral Theory*. Esbjörn-Hargens (Ed.). Forthcoming SUNY press.
- Stein, Z. (in press) On the use of the term Integral. Published proceedings of the 2nd biannual Integral Theory Conference. Esbjörn-Hargens (Ed.). Forthcoming SUNY press.
- Westbrook, Robert. (1991) John Dewey and American Democracy. Cornell University Press.

Ithica.

Wiener, P. P. (1949). *Evolution and the founders of Pragmatism*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

Wilber, K. (1999). *Integral Psychology*. Boston: Shambhala.

Wilber, K. (2005). Excerpts from Volume 2 of the Kosmos Trilogy, forthcoming. Integral Institute. Retrieved from <http://wilber.shambhala.com/index.cfm/>

Wilber, Ken. (1995). *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality - The Spirit of Evolution*. Boston: Shambhala Publications.

Wilber, K. (2010). *Integral Spirituality*. Boston: Shambhala Publications.